South Carolina Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 1 1966-1967 Survey Issue

Article 10

1967

Evidence
John M. Harrington

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harrington, John M. (1967) "Evidence," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Harrington: Evidence
EVIDENCE
I. RIzvAxoy

Lindsey v. City of Greenville' was an action for crop damage
allegedly sustained when waters were released from the defendant city's dam and reservoir. At the trial, the defendant sought
unsuccessfully to introduce photographs and expert testimony
to show flooding conditions in watersheds adjacent to that in
which defendant's dam and plaintiff's property were located.
On appeal the court affirmed since there was no testimony to
show that rainfall in the adjacent watersheds entered defendant's reservoir or in any way affected the flooding of plaintiff's
crop.
II. PAR oL EvWDENuO RIum
In Commeria Credit Corp. v. NeZson Motors, Inc. 2 the plaintiff finance corporation sought to recover certain sums allegedly
due it under a written contract whereby the defendant automobile dealer had assigned installment contracts to the plaintiff at
a discount. In its answer, the defendant alleged that the losses
sustained by Commercial were caused by the latter's failure to
use reasonable care and diligence in collecting the balances due
on the accounts it had purchased. The answer also set up a
counterclaim for losses incurred by Nelson resulting from the
same alleged omissions of duty. The circuit judge struck the
defense and counterclaim as sham and frivolous holding that the
rights of the parties were controlled by the terms of the written
contract which did not impose any obligation on Commercial
with respect to the collection of the assigned accounts. The
court reversed on the ground that "under the terms of the contract in the light of surrounding circumstances, including the
relationship of the parties and their past dealings, it is, to say
the least, fairly arguable that Commercial was impliedly obligated to pursue the collection of the accounts with reasonable
and customary diligence."- The court further held, in accord
with the general rule, that where there is nothing in the writing
affecting an essential element of the contract, evidence of prior
dealings between the parties to supply such element would in1. 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E2d 863 (1966).
2. 247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d 481 (1966).
3. Id. at 369, 147 S.E2d at 485. For a discussion of the court's reasoning
see this case surveyed elsewhere under the heading Contracts.
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volve no contradiction
of the writing and would not violate the
4
parol evidence rule.
III. HEARSAY

In Johnson v. Finney,5 an action by a pedestrian to recover
for injuries sustained when struck by an automobile, the trial
judge excluded a question put to the highway patrolman who
participated in the investigation of the collision as to whether
he was able to locate an "eye witness" to the accident. The court
held that there was no error as the answer would obviously
have been hearsay unless the patrolman had been present and
had seen an eye witness looking at it.
IV. WAIVER

OF OBJECTION TO

ADnDssimrraTY or

EVIDENCE

ian6

Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ju
is a case in which
the controlling issue was the question of ownership of an automobile. The trial judge admitted testimony concerning an
alleged bill of sale over the defendant's objection that the bill
of sale was the best evidence. On appeal, the court did not need
to consider the question of whether secondary evidence of the
contents of the bill of sale was admissible, since the defendant's
counsel, during cross-examination of the seller, examined the
seller regarding the bill of sale without reserving his objection.
It is well settled in South Carolina that, in such a case, the
objection to the testimony is waived.7
V. PARTY BOUND By HIS OwN WITNEsS' ADVERSE TEsTTm0N
In Criderv. Infinger Transp. Co." the court applied the general rule that a party to an action is bound by the testimony of
his own witnesses which is favorable to the adverse party where
he does not prove the facts to be contrary to the testimony of
such witnesses.9 This was an action to recover damages allegedly
4. Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869 (1941);
Chatfield-Woods Co. v. Harley, 124 S.C. 280, 117 S.E. 539 (1923).

5. 246 S.C. 366, 143 S.E.2d 722 (1965).
6. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
7. Gary v. Jordan, 236 S.C. 144, 113 S.E2d 730 (1960); Richardson v.

Register, 227 S.C. 81, 87 S.E.2d 40 (1955); Robinson v. Blakely, 4 Rich. 586

(1851).

8. 248 S.C. 10, 148 S.E.2d 732 (1966).
9. Elrod v. All, 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964); Porter v. Hardee,

241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963); Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238
S.C. 217, 119 S.E.2d 746 (1961).
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caused by the negligence of the defendant, its agents and servants. The court held that the trial court had erroneously refused
the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment
n.o.v. An examination of the testimony of all the plaintiff's
witnesses, other than one Boswell, did not show any acts of
commission or omission on the part of defendant or its agents
or servants to prove or raise an inference of negligence or
willfulness. Boswell, the defendant's assistant manager, was
called by the plaintiff as one of his witnesses. The testimony
of Boswell exonerated the defendant of any actionable negligence or willfulness, and the court held that "the record fails
to show the facts to be other than this witness testified and,
having called him as a witness, the respondent was bound by
his testimony."' 0
VI. Co3MPETNCY

A. Evidence of Prior Conviction
In State v. Millings" the defendant, who had been convicted
of manslaughter in the lower court, appealed on the ground
that the trial judge erred in admitting testimony elicited from
the defendant on cross-examination that he had been convicted
of auto theft in 1944 and receiving stolen goods in 1946 since
such evidence was highly prejudicial. 12 The court affirmed,
holding that "evidence of prior convictions of crimes involving
moral terpitude may be introduced into evidence on the issue
of credibility of a witness."' 3 This is in accord with the well
settled rule that "when [the defendant] elected to testify in his
own behalf he assumed the same role as any other witness, subjecting himself to the duties and liabilities of witnesses generally, and by the mere act of becoming a witness he placed his
reputation for truth and veracity in issue, thereby making it
permissible to show any of his past transactions tending to
affect his credibility .. .. "4 The court has also stated that
10. Crider v. Infinger Transp. Co., 248 S.C. 10, 17, 148 S.E.2d 732, 735

(1966).

11. 247 S.C. 52, 145 S.E.2d 422 (1965).
12. After a discussion of the principle issue, the court observed that an
objection in the terms no more specific than "highly prejudicial" is too general, citing Griswold v. Texas Co., 163 S.C. 156, 161 S.E. 409 (1930).

13. State v. Millings, 247 S.C. 52, 53, 145 S.E2d 422, 423 (1948).
14. State v. Van Williams, 212 S.C. 110, 114, 46 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1948).
Accord, State v. Chasteen, 231 S.C. 141, 97 S.E.2d 517 (1957); State v.

Robertson, 26 S.C. 117, 1 S.E. 443 (1887).
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"there can be no doubt that proof that a witness has committed
larceny tends to affect his credibility."' 5
B. Dead Man Statute
The court in Long v. Conroy' 6 had occasion to determine the
applicability of section 24-40217 of the South Carolina Code
known as the Dead Man Statute. This was an action brought
by the testator's executors against his widow and, after her
death, continued against her executors to determine the ownership of certain bonds in the possession of the wife at the time
of her husband's death. At the trial, the testator's executor filed
a disclaimer to any executor's commissions on the bonds in
question and was allowed, over the objection of the defendant's
counsel, to testify as to certain transactions and communications
had by the witness with the testator and the testator's widow
which were material to the proof of plaintiff's case. On appeal
the court applied the test of Norris v. 07inkseales'8 finding that
the witness fell within a disqualified class since he was a party
to the action. The court also found that his testimony partook
of at least two of the disqualifying characteristics (it was in
regard to a transaction or communication between the witness
and a dead person and against a party defending the action as
executor of a deceased person) but not the third since a good
faith disclaimer filed by the witness eliminated any present or
previous interest of his that could be affected by the litigation.19
Since the testimony did not partake of all the disqualifying
at least one of the
characteristics in addition to falling within
20
admissible.
was
it
disqualified classes,
15. State v. Van Williams, supra; note 14, at 114, 46 S.E.2d at 667.
16. 246 S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965).
17. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 26-402 (1962). This section provides in part:
[N]o party to an action or proceeding... shall be examined in
regard to any transaction between such witness and a person at the
time of such examination deceased. . . against a party... defending
the action as executor . . . of such deceased person . . . when such
examination or any judgment or determination in such action or proceeding can in any manner affect the interest of such witness or the
interest previously owned or represented by him.
18. Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797 (1896).
19. Accord, Ex Parte Newton, 183 S.C. 379, 191 S.E. 59 (1937).
20. Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488, 25 S.E. 797 (1896).
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VII. OrnoW EvDENOE

A. Property Valuation
In Bagwell v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,2 1 a con-

detnnation proceeding, the trial judge refused to allow the plaintiff's witness to express an opinion as to the value of the property
where the witness testified that he operated a filling station
near the plaintiff's property and could see a portion of the
property from his station. The supreme court affirmed. The
witness's testimony did not come within the exceptions to the
general rule that the opinions of witnesses are not competent
evidence since no attempt was made to qualify the witness as an
expert on the appraisal of real estate and there was no showing
that as a non-expert he was particularly familiar with the
22
property sought to be condemned.
B. Medical Experts
Kapuschinsky v. United States,2 3 decided by the United
States District Court sitting in South Carolina, was an action
under the Federal Tort Claims Act in which the minor plaintiff
claimed she suffered a severe and permanent disabling condition
as a direct result of the government's negligence while she was
a newborn infant in the United States Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina. The plaintiff's counsel propounded to a
medical expert in the field of microbiology a hypothetical question relative to the source or cause of the premature infant
plaintiff's infection. The posed question included the facts that
the plaintiff was infected with an organism that, according to
the hospital pathologist's tests, was sensitive to two antibiotics
and that a Wave who had handled the infant was infected by
that organism and was shown by identical tests to be sensitive
to the same two antibiotics. The defendant's counsel contended
that the fact that the Wave had handled the child was not in
evidence; therefore, the hypothetical question was objectionable.2 4 The court found, however, that there was "contact"
between the Wave and the child, so the objection was without
21. 246 S.C. 569, 145 S.E.2d 17 (1965).
22. See Knight v. Sullivan Power Co., 140 S.C. 296, 138 S.E. 818 (1926);
Jones v. Fuller, 19 S.C. 66 (1882); 5 NicHoLs, EmINENT DoAIx, § 18.4 [4]
(rev. 3d ed. 1962).
23. 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966).
24. See State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 155 S.E. 509 (1929).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLixA LAw REVIEw
[Vol. 19

merit. The microbiologist's testimony did not involve the issue
of degree of skill exercised by members of his profession in
Charleston and similar localities, and the court further held
that the fact that he was not familiar with medical practices
in the Charleston area would not bar his testifying as to medical cause and bffect or identity of the organism. The court also
stated that "this was not a case in which the expert is giving
an opinion founded upon the opinion of another expert ....,25
and that the "similarity of identity of the strains was necessarily grounded upon a consideration of the sensitivity tests."28
It is a general rule that the opinion of an expert cannot be predicated upon the opinions, inferences and conclusions of other
expert or lay witnesses but it may be based upon facts testified
to by another expert or upon a test made by another expert
witness. 28 The evidence in this case as to the identity or method

of transmittal of the organism was entirely circumstantial. The
court, in line with the South Carolina cases, stated that circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence2 9 and
that the "legal burden of proof on the plaintiff does not become
more onerous because the evidence is circumstantial .... "8 0 The
plaintiff placed a local general practitioner on the stand to give
expert testimony as to the standard of care required of the hospital in dealing with the plaintiff. The fact that the witness
was not a specialist diminished the weight of his testimony,3 1
and the court recognized the difficulty which the plaintiff had
in obtaining local specialists to testify, taking judicial notice
of the "well recognized reluctance of members of the medical
32
profession to testify in cases of this type."

25. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 741 (D.S.C. 1966).

26. Ibid.
27. Ellis v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 334, 197 S.E. 398 (1938).
See 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 791 (1939).
28. Smith v. Middlesboro Elec. Co., 164 Ky. 46, 174 S.W. 773 (1915).

20 Am. Jun. Evidence § 791 (1939).

See

29. E.g., Chaney v. Burgess, 246 S.C. 261, 143 S.E.2d 521 (1965) ; Horton

v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962).

30. Kapuschinslcy v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D.S.C. 1966).

See, e.g., Leek v. New So. Express Lines, 192 S.C. 527, 7 S.E.2d 459 (1940).
31. See Annot., 54 A.L.R. 860 (1928).

32. Kupuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 744 (D.S.C. 1966).
See generally Belli, An Ancient Theory Still Applied: The Silent Medical
Treatment, 1 Vr.mL. L. REv. 250 (1956).
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EPMOR

3
In South CarolinaState Highway Dep't v. Graydon, 3 a condetonation case, the trial court refused to strike the testimony of
a real estate expert called by the landowner that the value of
the property taken was 4,365 dollars. The only other evidence on
the issue was the testimony of the landowner that the diminution in the value of his property as a result of the condemnation
was 5,000 dollars. On appeal, the court did not reach the question of the admissibility of the expert opinion because the usual
presumption of prejudice from the admission of incompetent
evidence having some probative value3 4 does not arise where the
testimony complained of was more favorable to the complaining
party than the only other evidence upon the issue.

JoHN

33. 246 S.C. 509, 144 S.E2d 484 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Cooper Corp. v. Jeffcoat, 217 S.C.
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489, 61 S.E.2d 53 (1950).

7

